AS WE DISCUSSED EARLIER PRESIDENT TRUMP SEEMS TO HAVE WALKED INDIA INTO THE ARMS OF CHINA AND RUSSIA, SO HOW CAN THE U.S. NAVIGATE THIS NEW SHIFT?

IN HER NEW BOOK EMMA ASHFORD OFFERS SOME SUGGESTIONS AS SHE EXPLAINS NOW TO WALTER ISAACSON.

>> THANK YOU, CHRISTIANE, AND EMMA ASHFORD.

THANKS FOR COMING ON THE SHOW.

>> IT'S GREAT TO BE HERE.

>> YOUR NEW BOOK IT IS A CRY FOR REALIST FOREIGN POLICY.

EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT YOU MEAN BY REALISTIC FOREIGN AND HOW THAT'S DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE'RE DOING.

>> YEAH, I THINK REALISM IS ONE OF THE TWO POLLS AROUND WHICH U.S. FOREIGN TENDS TO CLUSTER.

SOMETIMES WE'RE VERY IDEALISTIC WOOD ROW WILSON, FOR EXAMPLE, AND SOMETIMES WE ARE IDELISTS AND I THINK EISENHOWER ARE EXAMPLES OF THAT.

THE POINT I MAKE IN THE BOOK DURING THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD WE HAVE EFFECTIVELY ENGAGED IN A SERIES OF VERY TRANSFORMATIVE CRUSADING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS LIKE THE FREEDOM AGENDA UNDER BUSH AND THAT WE'VE FORGOTTEN WE ACTUALLY HAVE TO OPERATE IN THIS COMPETITION AND POLITICS AND WE NEED TO GET BACK TO THINKING A BIT MORE ABOUT INTERESTS AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO ACHIEVE THOSE.

>> YOU TALK ABOUT GREAT POWER COMPETITION AND THE BALANCES OF POWER THAT COME WITH THAT.

THERE WERE PICTURES THIS WEEK THAT WOULD JUST SEND SHUDDERS DOWN THE SPINE OF A REALIST, WOULD BE APPALLED.

AND THAT WAS PRIME MINISTER MODI MEETING WITH PRESIDENT XI OF CHINA AND PRESIDENT PUTIN OF RUSSIA.

AND I THINK BISMARCK AND MATTERNICK, KISSINGER FOR THAT MATTER WOULD SAY YOU NEVER WHEN YOU HAVE A REALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY ALLOW MORE THAN ONE OF YOUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES TO GET CLOSE TO EACH OTHER.

IN THIS CASE WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO DO IT TO ALL THREE.

IS THIS A REALLY BAD FUMBLE AND A RELIST FOREIGN POLICY?

>> I THINK SO.

AND, AGAIN, THIS IS NOT SOMETHING THAT IS UNIQUE TO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION.

IF ANYTHING IN MANY WAYS THEY'VE BEEN SLIGHTLY MORE RELIST THAN SAY THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION OR SOME OF THE OTHERS IN THE RECENT PAST.

BUT, YES, ALIENATING INDIA, THREATENING SANCTIONS RELATED TO WAR IN UKRAINE, THAT IS AN EXAMPLE OF PUTTING IDEALS AND VALUES ABOVE WHAT ARE ACTUALLY U. S. INTERESTS.

AND IN THIS CASE, YOU KNOW, WE RISK LOSING INDIA AS A PARTNER IN COMPETITION WITH CHINA IF WE SPEND SO MUCH TIME ON EUROPE AND UKRAINE, AND WE ELEVATE THAT OVER INDIA AND ITS ROLE IN THE ENDO PACIFIC.

AND SO THOSE ARE THE KIND OF HARD CHOICES THAT POLITICIANS, RELIST POLITICIANS HAVE TO MAKE.

WHAT I SEE TOO OFTEN IS TO TALK ABOUT THIS WONDERFUL TALK ABOUT VALUES BUT TO IGNORE THOSE SORT OF CONCRETE INTERESTS WE MIGHT BE LEAVING BEHIND.

>> WELL, HAVE WE EVER HAD A TIME WHERE WE WERE SUDDENLY ABLE TO TAKE WHAT WAS AN ALLY, INDIA, IN MANY WAYS.

AN ALLY INDIA WHO WAS VERY MUCH OPPOSED TO CHINA AND LIKE WISE KISSINGER AND NIXON TAKE CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND PULL THEM APART.

THERE WAS PART OF THEIR REALISM.

HAVE WE EVER SEEN A TIME WHEN YOU HAVE THREE POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES THROWN TOGETHER LIKE WE'VE SEEN THIS WEEK?

>> I DON'T THINK I WOULD NECESSARILY DESCRIBE INDIA AS AN ADVERSARY, BUT I DO THINK THIS IS A LEFLEXION OF THE FACT THE WORLD IS BECOMING MORE MULTI-POLAR.

THERE ARE MORE IMPORTANT PLAYERS, AGAIN, THAN THERE WERE FOR THE LAST 30 YEARS.

AND IN SOME WAYS WHAT I THINK THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO DO IS BECOME A LITTLE MORE LIKE THOSE COUNTRIES IN HOW THEY PURSUE FOREIGN POLICY.

THE INDIANS, THEY KNOW THEY HAVE AN INTEREST IN COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CHINA.

AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE OTHER OPTIONS, AND THEY ARE GOING TO EXERCISE THOSE.

THEY'RE GOING TO TRY WITH CHINA.

THEY'RE GOING TO CONTINUE TO BUY RUSSIAN OIL.

THEY HAVE THESE OPTIONS.

THE UNITED STATES, IF WE CONTINUE TO JUST LOCK OURSELVES INTO, YOU KNOW, WE HAVE A WESTERN ALLIANCE AND WE DON'T TALK TO OTHER STATES, RIGHT, THAT'S VERY RESTRICTIVE, AND WE ARE LOSING OUT WHEN WE COULD BE DOING SOMETHING LIKE THE INDIANS OR OTHERS ARE DOING.

>> WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE OTHER GREAT POWERS, ARE THERE ANY OF THEM THAT WE SHOULD BE BUILDING BETTER RELATIONSHIPS WITH?

AND I MEAN, SAY, INDIA OR PERHAPS CHINA?

THAT WE SHOULDN'T TRY TO FIGHT BOTH CHINA AND RUSSIA AT THE SAME TIME.

>> YOU KNOW, I TEND TO THINK, AND AGAIN THIS IS SORT OF A MAIN STREAM RELIST VIEW.

TEND TO THINK THE BIGGEST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES RIGHT NOW IS CHINA AND ITS GROWING INFLUENCE IN ASIA.

FOR ME I WOULD PRIORITIZE THAT.

AND THAT DOES MEAN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH INDIA.

A LITTLE MORE CONTROVERSIALLY IT PROBABLY MEANS IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, AND I THINK WE DON'T AGREE WITH THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IN MANY THINGS, BUT I THINK THIS IS ONE AREA WHERE THEY ARE CORRECT.

REDUCING THE U.S.

RELATIONSHIP JUST TO UKRAINE AND IGNORING ALL THE OTHER AREAS, CHINA, THE ARCTIC, WHERE WE MIGHT NEED TO TALK TO THE RUSSIANS OR POTENTIALLY NOT HAVE THEM JUST A JUNIOR PARTNER TO CHINA, THAT WOULD ACTUALLY BE IN THE U.S. INTEREST.

>> ONE OF THE THINGS I DON'T GET, THOUGH, IS WHY DO YOU THINK CHINA IS SUCH A BIG THREAT?

ISN'T IT MAINLY AN ECONOMIC COMPETITOR?

>> CHINA IS A MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COMPETITOR.

AND IF YOU ACTUALLY LOOK AT WHICH STATES COULD CHALLENGE THE UNITED STATES MILITARILY IN ASIA, IN THE WORLD IT'S --IT'S CHINA, RIGHT?

THE RUSSIANS CANNOT CONQUER EASTERN UKRAINE.

THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER EUROPE.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE IS NO COUNTRY THAT IS POISED TO CONQUER THE MIDDLE EAST, RIGHT?

SO THESE ARE IMPORTANT REGIONS.

IN ASIA CHINA HAS THAT POTENTIAL.

>>ATE, THE CHINESE POISED TO CONQUER ANYTHING?

PERHAPS TAIWAN, BUT THEY HAVEN'T MADE A MOVE THERE.

>> POTENTIALLY TAIWAN, BUT I THINK YOUR LAST POINT ABOUT ECONOMIC COMPETITOR IS ACTUALLY THE MORE IMPORTANT ONE.

SO IT'S NOT JUST A MILITARY THREAT.

IT IS AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM.

CHINA HAS THE ABILITY TO PUSH THE UNITED STATES OUT OF ASIA THROUGH DIPLOMACY, THROUGH ECONOMIC STATE CRAFT IN WAYS THAT WOULD LEAVE US POORER AND MORE ISOLATED.

AND TO ME THAT IS THE BIG THREAT OF GROWING CHINESE INFLUENCE, AND SO THAT'S WHY I WOULD FOCUS ON THAT RATHER THAN ON SOME OF THESE OTHER REGIONS.

>> YOU KEEP USING THE PHRASE IN THE BOOK "COERCIVE ECONOMIC STATE CRAFT," AND I GUESS ONE OF THE GREAT EXAMPLES OF IT WAS WHEN RUSSIA DID ITS LATEST GRAND ASSAULT ON UKRAINE, WE PUT WHAT WERE CALLED CRIPPLING SANCTIONS.

AND EVEN TRUMP DECIDED TO DO MORE, AND THE RESULT OF THAT IS THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY HASN'T COLLAPSED AND RUSSIA HAS NOW CREATED ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA AND WITH INDIA.

WAS THAT A MISTAKE TO TRY TO DEAL WITH IT THROUGH CRIPPLING SANCTIONS, OR DID WE NOT DO ENOUGH?

>> LOOK, I THINK THAT ONE THING THAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE LAST 30 YEARS IS THAT NO MATTER HOW POWERFUL THE UNITED STATES, YOU KNOW, WE ARE FINANCIALLY CENTER OF THE WORLD.

WE HAVE THIS HUGE MILITARY.

THERE ARE STILL THINGS THAT ARE UNACHIEVABLE EVEN FOR THAT POWER, WHETHER THAT IS TRANSFORMING STATE INTO DEMOCRACIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR WHETHER THAT IS E RUSSIA, A COUNTRY THAT PROVIDES 10 TO 12% OIL SUPPLY TO STOP A WAR THAT IT REALLY WANTS TO FIGHT.

AND SO WE HAVE SEEN THE LIMITS OF OUR ABILITY TO FORCE OTHER COUNTRIES TO DO WHAT WE WANT TO DO, AND THAT WAS DURING THIS PERIOD OF EXTREME U. S. DOMINANCE.

SO, AGAIN, ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS THAT I MAKE IN THE BOOK IS WE NEED TO THINK GOING FORWARD AS THAT PREPONDERANCE OF POWER DECLINES, IT'S GOING TO GET EVEN HARDER TO USE COERCION TO FORCE OTHER COUNTRIES.

WE NEED TO THINK ABOUT OTHER WAYS.

AND, AGAIN, I THINK IN THE CASE OF UKRAINE I UNDERSTAND WHY THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION WENT THE SANCTIONS ROUTE.

IT WAS SORT OF A MIDDLE ROAD BETWEEN DOING NOTHING AND STARTING A WAR WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

BUT WE SHOULDN'T PRETEND THAT IT WAS EVER GOING TO ACTUALLY FORCE ANOTHER GREAT POWER TO COME TO, YOU KNOW --TO STOP ENTIRELY WHAT IT WAS DOING.

>> WELL, YOU TALKED IN THE BOOK ABOUT WE NEED TO HAVE SELECTABLE PARTNERSHIPS.

AND I THINK YOU CONTRAST IN THAT BOOK TO WHAT WE USED TO THINK OF OUR ALLIANCE AS SACRED OBLIGATIONS.

I MEAN, IT WAS ALMOST INVOKED AS IF IT WERE MORAL, NOT JUST REALISTIC.

NOW, I THINK YOU'RE SAYING IN THE BOOK WE HAVE TO GET AWAY FROM SACRED OBLIGATION TYPES OF ALLIANCES AND MOVE TOWARDS WHAT --I THINK YOU EVEN USE THE WORDS MUNDANE, MUNDANE AND FLEXIBLE PARTNERSHIPS.

LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THAT.

HOW WOULD THAT HAVE HELPED IN UKRAINE?

>> LOOK, ALLIANCES ARE TOOLS, AND I THINK THAT IS SOMETHING THAT HAS BEEN BEEN FORGOTTEN IN MANY WAYS DURING THE UNI-POLAR MOMENT.

VALUES LIKE NATO HAD VALUEST TO THEM.

WE WORKED WITH DEMOCRACIES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME INTERESTS MATTERED A LOT DURING THAT PERIOD.

WE HAD AUTOCRACIES LIKE TURKEY THAT WERE WELCOMED INTO NATO BECAUSE THEY WERE STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT.

WHEN JOE BIDEN TALKED ABOUT ALLIANCE AS A SACRED OBLIGATIONS AND HE STARTED TO TALK ABOUT UKRAINE, WE SAW THINGS LIKE IN THE RUNUP TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE OR EVEN CONSIDER THE NOTION THAT MAYBE UKRAINE WOULDN'T JOIN NATO, EVEN IF COULD PREVENT A WAR.

AND SO FOR ME THAT IS THE DIFFERENCE, RIGHT?

DOES UKRAINE HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO JOIN A WESTERN ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES?

THAT'S A VALUE JUDGMENT, RIGHT?

>> WELL, SO GIVE ME YOUR SOLUTION THERE?

WHAT SHOULD WE OFFER IN THIS WAR?

>> I THINK EARLIER ON BEFORE THE CONFLICT, I THINK POTENTIALLY THERE WERE NEGOTIATIONS THAT COULD HAVE CREATED SOME FORM OF NEUTRALITY FOR UKRAINE THE WAY FINLAND DID, FOR EXAMPLE.

>> WELL, THIS IS NOT FINLAND NOW.

>> EXACTLY.

THEY CHOSE TO JOIN SORT OF THE WESTERN COALITION HERE.

LOOK, THAT SHIP HAS SAILED TIPT.

I THINK FOR UKRAINE THE BEST AVAILABLE OPTION --IT IS A FORM OF NEUTRALITY BUT A FORM OF NEUTRALITY WHERE THEY LOST A LOT OF TERRITORY.

I THINK WHAT WE SAW IN THIS WAR IS THE U.S., THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE NOT WILLING TO FIGHT A WAR AGAINST RUSSIA FOR UKRAINE.

TO ME THAT HIGHLIGHTS THESE VALUE DRIVEN STATEMENTS.

URSULA VANDERLINE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION SAYING WE'LL DO ANYTHING ELSE AND THE UNITED STATES ALLIANCE SAYING, NO, WE'RE NOT GOING TO BITE FOR UKRAINE.

WE NEED HAVE DIPLOMACY THAT REFLECTS THE REALITY OF WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO NOT JUST THE SORT OF FREE-FLOATING VALUES STATEMENTS.

>> SO YOU WANT TO CHANGE A LOT OF WHAT WE WOULD CALL SACRED OBLIGATIONS AND SAY, NO, THEY SHOULD BE MORE MUNDANE OR I GUESS I'D JUST USE THE WORDS FLEXIBLE AND PRACTICAL PARTNERSHIPS.

DOES THAT INCLUDE ISRAEL?

>> ISRAEL IS A REALLY INTERESTING CASE.

IT HAS DISTINCT --SORT OF WE DON'T COMMIT TO IT THE WAY WE COMMIT TO NATO STATES BUT WE HAVE TREATIES THAT OBLIGATE US TO CERTAIN THINGS.

LOOK, I THINK THE ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL SHOULD BE OPEN TO QUESTION THE SAME WAY THAT ANY OTHER ALLIANCE WOULD BE.

AND IN THE CURRENT MOMENT I WOULD SAY THAT OUR ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL IS TING OUR ABILITY TO WORK WITH, NEGOTIATE WITH BASICALLY EVERY STATE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND FRANKLY SOME IN ASIA, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IND NEEGTSA, A VERY IMPORTANT STATE IN ASIA, HAS GOT WORSE BECAUSE OF THE WAR IN GAZA.

WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO THINK, AGAIN, OF INTERESTS RATHER THAN SAYING THE ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL IS A SACRED OBLIGATION AND WE MUST KEEP SUPPORTING THEM NO MATTER WHAT IT MEANS FOR US.

>> ONE OF THE THINGS YOU ARGUE FOR IS A PIVOT TO ASIA.

OF COURSE I REMEMBER BARACK OBAMA AND KURT CAMPBELL AND OTHERS IN THAT ADMINISTRATION SAYING, OKAY, WE'RE GOING TO PIVOT TO ASIA.

I NEVER QUITE KNEW WHAT THAT MEANT.

DID THAT MEAN WE'RE GOING FOOGAUGE WITH CHINA MORE, HAVE BETTER ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEM?

DID IT MEAN WE WERE GOING TO PUT MORE WARSHIPS THERE SO THAT WE COULD COUNTER CHINA?

WHAT DOES PIVOTING TO ASIA MEAN, AND WHY WOULD YOU HAVE TO GIVE UP EUROPE TO DO IT?

>> I THINK PIVOTING TO ASIA, AGAIN, VERY CORNY PHRASE AT THIS POINT BECAUSE IT HASN'T HAPPENED, BUT I THINK WHAT WE MEAN BY THAT --WHAT I MEAN BY THAT IS WE NEED TO FOCUS MORE OF OUR ATTENTION ON ASIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC AS A REGION THAT IS THE WORLD'S MOST POPULOUS REGION, IT'S GROWING FAST AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT REGION, WE NEED TO FOCUS OUR ATTENTION THERE AND LESS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE.

AND SO THAT DOES TO SOME EXTENT MEAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS.

IF YOU LOOK AT RECENT DEBATES, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION OVER SOME OF THE WEAPONS TO UKRAINE, THERE IS A CONCRETE TRADEOFF BETWEEN WEAPONS BEING SENT TO UKRAINE AND ONES THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED TO DEFEND U.S.

BASES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT WITH CHINA.

SO THERE ARE TRADEOFFS THERE.

BUT THERE ARE ALSO OTHER PLACES WHERE WE NEED TO SIMPLY BUILD UP OUR CAPACITY.

I'LL GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE A COLLEAGUE OF MINE DOES A BUNCH OF WORK ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND DUG INTO THE DILL TAZ AND LOOKED AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S PIVOT TO ASIA.

WHAT HAS ACTUALLY HAPPENED AND HE FOUND BASICALLY NOTHING HAS CHANGED.

NO MORE STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES WERE FOCUSED ON ISSUES RELATED TO ASIA.

THEY WERE MOSTLY STILL FOCUSED ON EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, AND THEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, ALL OF THESE THINGS THAT WEREN'T AS RELEVANT FOR ASIA.

SO WE JUST NEED TO BUILD THESE CAPABILITIES UP.

>> YOU SAY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD WE REALLY HAVE TO BUILD UP THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR FRIENDS.

I'M WONDERING NOW IN THE PAST FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN YEARS WHO ARE THESE FRIENDS WE'RE TALKING ABOUT?

IF WE DECIDED WE'RE NOT GOING TO BUILD UP NATO, WE'RE NOT GOING TO BUILD UP EUROPE, WE'RE HAVING DISPUTES WITH MANY OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND WE PUSHED RUSSIA, CHINA, AND INDIA ALL TOGETHER IN BEING ADVERSARIES, WHO ARE THE FRIENDS WE HAVE NOW?

DO WE HAVE MORE FRIENDS THAN WE USED TO?

>> LOOK, I TALK ABOUT ENABLING U. S. ALLIES TO CARRY MORE OF THE WEIGHT.

AND I THINK, YOU KNOW, THERE IS NOT A TRADEOFF, RIGHT?

BUT IF YOU ARE GOING TO GET ALLIES IN NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, TO DO MORE FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY TO SPEND MORE ON DEFENSE, TO BUILD UP THOSE MILITARY CAPABILITIES SO THAT THE U. S. CAN DO LESS, YOU ARE GOING TO NEED A LITTLE TOUGH LOVE.

AGAIN, I THINK THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS GONE PERHAPS A LITTLE TOO FAR IN THAT DIRECTION.

BUT WHEN I TALK ABOUT ENABLING OUR FRIENDS TO DO MORE, WHAT I MEAN IS FINDING THESE ALLIANCES WHERE THE U.S. HAS CARRIED MOST OR ALL OF THE WEIGHT FOR A COUPLE OF DECADES NOW, RIGHT?

EUROPEAN STATES JUST DON'T SPEND ENOUGH ON DEFENSE.

THEY'RE NOT CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THEMSELVES.

THEY RELY ON THE UNITED STATES.

WE SHOULD BE DOING LESS, THEY SHOULD BE DOING MORE.

>> DOES THAT MEAN WE SHOULD BE PULLING ALL OF OUR TROOPS OUT OF EUROPE WITHIN THE NEXT TEN YEARS?

>> I THINK OVER THE NEXT 110 TO 15 YEARS, YES, THE U. S. SHOULD ENGAGE IN A SAFE WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE.

I THINK THAT IS THE ONLY WAY YOU SUCCESSFULLY TRANSFER.

>> WHY?

>> BECAUSE IF WE DON'T PULL BACK, THEY WON'T DO IT.

I THINK WE'VE SEEN THIS FROM HISTORY BASICALLY THE ONLY TIMES THE EUROPEAN -- >> WAIT, YOU DON'T SEE THEM DOING IT IN UKRAINE NOW?

>> I DO SEE THEM STARTING TO STEP UP AND I THINK IN MANY WAYS NOW IT'S BECAUSE THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAS PULLED BACK.

WE SAW YOUR PAN STATES START TO DO MORE.

WE SAW THAT SPENDING PLEDGE AT THE SUMMIT IN THE HAGUE, WHICH MAY OR MAY THOUGHT BE REFLECTED IN CAPABILITIES, BUT THAT IS THE MOST FORWARD THINKING VERSION OF BURDEN SHIFTING WE HAVE SEEN.

THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLE WHERE WE'VE SEEN EUROPEAN STATES ACTUALLY START TO STEP UP.

AND SO I THINK THAT A PROPERLY COMMUNICATED, PROPERLY PHASED U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE OVER TIME THAT LETS EUROPEAN STATES BUILD THE CAPABILITIES AND STEP UP, I THINK THAT WOULD BE GOOD FOR BOTH SIDES.

I THINK IT WOULD RESULT IN A MUCH MORE BALANCED ALLIANCE, WHERE COUNTRIES THAT ARE, YOU KNOW, POPULIST, ECONOMICALLY ADVANCED JUST LIKE US, THEY CAN DO MORE FOR THEMSELVES AND WE HAVE TO DO LESS AND CAN FOCUS OUR SCARCE RESOURCES ELSEWHERE.

>> NEAR THE END OF THIS BOOK, YOU TALK ABOUT PRESIDENT XI AND PRESIDENT PUTIN HAVING A MEETING A WHILE BACK.

AND THEY SAID WE'RE GOING INTO THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD, AND THEY SAID THAT THAT WOULD INEVITABLY BE A HARBINGER OF THE DECLINE OF THE UNITED STATES.

ARE THEY RIGHT?

>> I DON'T THINK THAT'S TRUE.

I USE THE PHRASE RELATIVE DECLINE EARLIER, AND THAT IS TO SAY THAT THE U.S. IS SEEING OTHER COUNTRIES RISE TO MEET IT, RIGHT?

OUR PREDOMINANCE OF POWER, THE AMOUNT WE'RE OUT AHEAD OF EVERYBODY ELSE.

THAT'S SHRINKING.

THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE'RE IN DECLINE, AND I THINK THE UNITED STATES IS VERY CAPABLE OF PIVOTING ITS, YOU KNOW, SCARCE RESOURCES TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THIS MULTIPOLAR WORLD.

MY CONCERN IS THAT WE DON'T SHIFT IN TIME, WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE, YOU KNOW, AN EXTREMELY AMBITIOUS GLOBAL STRATEGY THAT OVERSTRETCHES US, THAT ADDS TO THE DEBT, THAT MEANS THAT WE CAN'T REALLY ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING ANYWHERE, WE'RE SO STRETCHED THIN.

IF WE DON'T ADAPT, I THINK THEN WE MIGHT BE IN MUCH MORE TROUBLE.

BUT I THINK THE OPPORTUNITY IS THERE FOR US TO ADAPT TO THIS EMERGING WORLD AND TO BUILD A VERY GOOD PLACE IN IT.

>> EMMA ASHFORD, THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR JOINING US.

>> THANKS FOR HAVING ME.