AMNA NAWAZ: For a perspective on all of this now, we turn to Daniel Byman.

He's a professor at Georgetown University and the author of "A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism."

Professor, you heard the Israeli foreign minister there say the goal here is to dismantle the Islamic Iranian infrastructures in the West Bank.

Who is he talking about?

What are the groups that we know are operating from there that threaten Israel?

DANIEL BYMAN, Georgetown University: The West Bank is home to a number of different Palestinian groups.

Islamic Jihad, Hamas both have a presence there.

And the -- but the biggest problem for Israel in recent years have been smaller groups that are really not affiliated with any of the major organizations often composed of local individuals, and places like Jenin have been hotbeds for these groups.

AMNA NAWAZ: And what do we know about those groups?

Have they been able to launch strikes into Israel?

DANIEL BYMAN: For the most part, they haven't attacked within Israel.

Their efforts have been concentrated at times on Israeli troops, but especially going after Israeli settlements on the West Bank.

AMNA NAWAZ: But what about the way in which Israel has gone in here?

We saw the combination of airstrikes and ground battles and also bulldozing roads and communities.

Why those tactics?

DANIEL BYMAN: So, Israel in the past has relied primarily on the Palestinian Authority, the government or, I should say, the de facto government in the West Bank, that has run it in conjunction with Israel.

And their security forces have become weaker.

Israel has over time ignored them.

So, Israeli officials are deciding to take action their own because they feel the Palestinian security forces won't do so.

To do that, though, these groups are often deep in the West Bank.

They're in neighborhoods that are certainly hostile to Israel.

And Israeli forces are afraid of improvised explosive devices.

They're afraid of snipers.

And so they often go in with these massive armored bulldozers that detonate IEDs before they can hurt people.

They are basically sniper-proof.

But at the same time, they're incredibly destructive.

They shield Israeli forces, but they destroy Palestinian neighborhoods.

And the much larger Israeli efforts are ways to control the territory more, to go after the arms caches, to have a better chance of arresting or killing individuals.

But it is a far more destructive, intrusive approach.

AMNA NAWAZ: Professor, the ongoing violence and the increase in violence in the West Bank hasn't gotten as much attention, obviously, as Israel's war against Hamas in Gaza.

But when you pull back, it's worth reminding folks the West Bank has been under Israeli military occupation for decades.

It's home to some 500,000 Israeli settlers and settlements largely deemed illegal or illegitimate by the international community.

How does all of that factor into this increase in violence we have seen recently there?

DANIEL BYMAN: So, the West Bank is far more sensitive politically for Israel than Gaza.

When Israel left Gaza in 2005, it was something that there were only a few small Israeli settlements there.

It was controversial.

But at the time, it was nothing like the controversy in the West Bank.

And the Israeli settlement numbers have grown.

Their political power has grown.

You have members of the current government that are actively arming the settlers or otherwise supporting them.

And the settlers themselves have been responsible for a lot of violence on Palestinian communities, at times pushing them out of their land, at times simply harassing them.

So, the dynamics are quite different than they are in Gaza.

AMNA NAWAZ: In just about the minute-and-a-half I have left, this is now essentially a third front for Israel here.

The war in Gaza continues.

We know they're trading fire with Hezbollah forces across their northern border.

Can Israeli forces sustain a fight on all three fronts?

DANIEL BYMAN: So, the violence in the West Bank is far less in terms of the requirements for Israeli forces than what was needed in Gaza in the past.

And since the Israeli operations in Gaza, while still considerable, are not comparable to their peak six months ago, Israel does have some spare capacity.

Also, a lot of what has been used in the West Bank has been police forces, often obviously paramilitary forces.

So the West Bank requirements are real, but they're not overwhelming.

On the other hand, if there were a conflict with Hezbollah and Lebanon, that would be far more demanding than any of these conflicts.

And that -- it would be very difficult for Israel to sustain conflicts in the West Bank, especially Gaza, at the same time.

AMNA NAWAZ: That is Georgetown University Professor Daniel Byman joining us tonight.

Professor, thank you very much for your time.

We appreciate it.

DANIEL BYMAN: My pleasure.